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The Value of In fo rma t ion  i n  S p e c u l a t i v e  Markets  
J e f f r e y  F. J a f f e *  and Robert  L. Winkler** 
1. I n t r o d u c t i o n  
A number o f  w r i t e r s  have examined t h e  v a l u e  of  informa- 
t i o n  i n  economic a . c t i v i t y .  Among o t h e r  u s e s ,  t h e  l i t e r a t u r e  h a s  
h a s  emphasized t h a t  i n f o r m a t i o n  can improve t h e  d e c i s i o n s  
of  t h e  f i r m ,  b r i n g  t o g e t h e r  p o t e n t i a l  buye r s  and s e l l e r s ,  
I 
and i n c r e a s e  t h e  t r a d i n g  p r o f  i t s  o f  i n d i v i d u a l s .  T h i s  
pape r  c o n s i d e r s  t h e  e f f e c t s  of i n f o r m a t i o n  on t r a d i n g  p r o f i t s  
and d e t e r m i n e s  o p t i m a l  t r a d i n g  p o l i c i e s  under  two t y p e s  o f  
t r a d i n g  p r o c e d u r e s .  
P rev ious  r e s e a r c h  i n  t h i s  a r e a  h a s  emphasized t h a t  t h e  
informed i n v e s t o r  should  be  a b l e  t o  e x p l o i t  t h e  uninformed 
i n v e s t o r ,  t h a t  i n f o r m a t i o n  w i l l  be  produced f o r  t r a d i n g  pur -  
poses  ( even  a t  a  c o s t ) ,  and t h a t  t h i s  i n f o r m a t i o n  p r o d u c t i o n  
r2 i s  no t  n e c e s s a r i l y  Pa re to -op t ima l .  Though t h e  p r e s e n t  
p a p e r  d o e s  n o t  d i s a g r e e  w i t h  t h e  above,  we p o i n t  o u t  t h a t  
t h e  magnitude of  t h e  e f f e c t s  i s  de te rmined  by t h e  t y p e  o f  
marke t  i n v o l v e d .  I n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  t h e  above e f f e c t s  a r e  mini-  
mized i n  marke ts  t h a t  a r e  dominated by s p e c u l a t i v e  t r a d e r s  
( i . e .  t r a d e r s  who a r e  no t  i n t e r e s t e d  i n  changing  e i t h e r  
t h e i r  l e v e l  o f  r i s k  o r  t h e i r  t o t a l  i n v e s t m e n t ) .  Th i s  o c c u r s  
e s s e n t i a l l y  because  n a i v e  s p e c u l a t i v e  i n v e s t o r s  have a  s i m p l e  
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mechanism, p r e v i o u s l y  i gno red  i n  t h e  l i t e r a t u r e ,  f o r  a v o i d i n g  
e x p l o i t a t i o n  by informed i n v e s t o r s .  They c a n  mere ly  s t o p  
t r a d i n g  i n  marke t s  where t h e y  have been l o s i n g  money from 
p r e v i o u s  t r a d e s .  
The above c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  a r e  d i s c u s s e d  i n  S e c t i o n s  2 
and 3 ,  where it  is  assumed t h a t  t h e r e  is  no market  maker 
( s p e c i a l i s t )  i n  t h e  economy. However, S e c t i o n  4 f o c u s e s  on  
s p e c u l a t i v e  t r a d i n g  i n  an  economy w i t h  a  marke t  maker. Under 
t h i s  reg ime,  eve ry  i n v e s t o r ,  no m a t t e r  how l i t t l e  i n f o r m a t i o n  
he  p o s s e s s e s ,  should  a t t e m p t  t o  t r a d e  w i t h  t h e  s p e c i a l i s t .  
The volume of  s p e c u l a t i v e  t r a d i n g ,  however, depends on t h e  
r e l a t i v e  a b i l i t y  of  t h e  s p e c i a l i s t  v i s - 8 - v i s  t h e  i n v e s t o r s  
a s  w e l l  a s  on o t h e r  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  such  a s  commissions.  A 
s t a t i s t i c a l  model i s  developed  i n  t h i s  s e c t i o n  t o  de t e rmine  
o p t i m a l  p o l i c i e s  f o r  t r a d i n g  w i t h  a  s p e c i a l i s t ,  and p r a c t i c a l  
a p p l i c a t i o n s  a r e  a l s o  d i s c u s s e d .  
The f i r s t  f o u r  s e c t i o n s  a r e  developed i n  a  framework 
s i m i l a r  t o  t h a t  o f  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  economics l i t e r a t u r e ,  because  
t h e  t y p e  o f  t r a d i n g  d i s c u s s e d  is  s e e n  most c l e a r l y  i n  f i n a n c i a l  
marke t s .  However, t h e  r e s u l t s  shou ld  be  a p p l i c a b l e  t o  a l l  
a r e a s  o f  economic a c t i v i t y .  I n  S e c t i o n  5 we i l l u s t r a t e  t h i s  
a p p l i c a b i l i t y  by c o n s i d e r i n g  a l t e r n a t i v e  forms o f  gambling.  
2 .  A Model f o r  S p e c u l a t i v e  T rad ing  
T r a d i t i o n a l l y ,  s tock-marke t  o b s e r v e r s  have d i f f e r e n t i a t e d  
s p e c u l a t i v e  t r a d i n g  from l i q u i d i t y  t r a d i n g .  T rad ing  on 
i n f o r m a t i o n  f o r  t h e  purpose  of  i n c r e a s i n g  p r o f i t s  i s  cons ide red  
s p e c u l a t i v e  t r a d i n g .  Trading  w i t h o u t  i n f o r m a t i o n  f o r  t h e  
pu rpose  of  changing  e i t h e r  t h e  pe rce ived  r i s k  of a  p o r t f o l i o  
o r  t h e  amount o f  funds  committed t o  t h e  s t o c k  market  i s  cons id-  
e r ed  l i q u i d i t y  t r a d i n g .  Admit ted ly ,  i t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  s e p a r a t e  
t h e s e  two t y p e s  of  t r a d i n g .  For  example, i f  t h e  r i s k - r e t u r n  
o p p o r t u n i t y  s e t  of a n  i n v e s t o r  i s  changed when he  r e c e i v e s  
i n f o r m a t i o n  c o n c e r n i n g  a  s e c u r i t y ,  he  may a d j u s t  h i s  r i s k  
p o s i t i o n  and h i s  c u r r e n t  t o t a l  inves tment  i n  t h e  s t o c k  marke t .  
Though bo th  l i q u i d i t y  and s p e c u l a t i v e  mot ives  a r e  i nvo lved  
i n  most t r a n s a c t i o n s ,  f o r  purposes  of  e x p o s i t i o n  we p r e s e n t  
a  model t h a t  a t t e m p t s  t o  s e p a r a t e  t h e  two mot ives .  
I n  o r d e r  t o  h i g h l i g h t  t h e  s p e c u l a t i v e  t r a d i n g  d e c i s i o n ,  
t h e  f o l l o w i n g  model i s  chosen:  
1. The c a p i t a l  market  has  ze ro  t r a n s a c t i o n  c o s t s  and no 
i n d i v i s i b i l i t i e s  i n  t h e  t r a d i n g  o f  s e c u r i t i e s .  
2 .  I n f o r m a t i o n  cannot  be  pooled  among i n v e s t o r s .  
3. Each i n d i v i d u a l  i s  r i s k - n e u t r a l  and a t t e m p t s  t o  
maximize expec t ed  r e t u r n .  Th i s  r e s t r i c t i o n  i s  added 
t o  a b s t r a c t  from t r a d i n g  t o  change r i s k .  
4 .  A one-per iod  model i s  assumed. Each i n d i v i d u a l  b r i n g s  
bo th  c a s h  and c l a i m s  on s e c u r i t i e s  t o  a  ta tonnement  
a u c t i o n  h e l d  a t  t h e  beg inn ing  of t h e  p e r i o d .  Here 
a l l  consumption-investment  d e c i s i o n s  a r e  made and 
s e c u r i t i e s  a r e  exchanged.  The v a l u e  of  each  s e c u r i t y ,  
which i s  de te rmined  by a n  exogenous s t o c h a s t i c  p r o c e s s ,  
i s  announced a t  t h e  end of  t h e  p e r i o d ,  and t h e  s e c u r i -  
t i e s  a r e  exchanged f o r  consumption a t  t h i s  t i m e .  
During t h e  p e r i o d ,  i n v e s t o r s  can  t r a d e  i n  r e s p o n s e  
t o  t h e  con t inuous  f low of  new i n f o r m a t i o n .  However, 
t h e r e  w i l l  be no wi thd rawa l s  from t h e  market  d u r i n g  
t h e  p e r i o d ,  a s  i n v e s t o r s  a r e  no t  p e r m i t t e d  t o  pu rchase  
any consumption goods d u r i n g  t h e  p e r i o d .  T h i s  assump- 
t i o n  i s  i nc luded  t o  s e p a r a t e  l i q u i d i t y  t r a d i n g ,  which 
shou ld  o c c u r  on ly  a t  t h e  beg inn ing  of t h e  p e r i o d ,  
from s p e c u l a t i v e  t r a d i n g ,  which o c c u r s  t h roughou t  
t h e  e n t i r e  p e r i o d .  
5.  I n v e s t o r s  canno t  s e l l  s h o r t .  A s  p o i n t e d  o u t  by 
Fama and ~ a f f e r , ~  u n l i m i t e d  buying  and s h o r t  s e l l i n g  
by expec t ed  v a l u e  maximizers  w i l l  r e s u l t  i n  i n f i n i t e  
buying  by t h o s e  who expec t  a  h i g h  p r i c e  f o r  a  s e c u r i t y  
and i n f i n i t e  buying  by t h o s e  who e x p e c t  a  h i g h  p r i c e  
f o r  a  s e c u r i t y  and i n f i n i t e  s h o r t  s e l l i n g  by t h o s e  
who e x p e c t  a  low p r i c e .  
From t h e  f o u r t h  a s sumpt ion ,  t h e  market  f o r  a l l  r i s k y  
a s s e t s  c l e a r s  t h rough  a  ta tonnement  b i d d i n g  p r o c e s s  a t  t h e  
o u t s e t  of t h e  p e r i o d .  Next ,  assume t h a t  l a t e r  i n  t h e  p e r i o d ,  
t h e  e q u i l i b r i u m  s i t u a t i o n  i s  d i s t u r b e d  by t h e  i n t r o d u c t i o n  
of  new i n f o r m a t i o n  p e r t a i n i n g  t o  a  s e c u r i t y .  An i n d i v i d u a l  
who, a f t e r  r e c e i v i n g  t h e  new i n f o r m a t i o n  now e x p e c t s  a  g r e a t e r  
r e t u r n  from t h i s  s e c u r i t y  t han  from o t h e r  s e c u r i t i e s ,  w i l l  
buy t h e  s e c u r i t y .  S i m i l a r l y ,  a n  i n d i v i d u a l  b e l i e v i n g  t h a t  
t h e  i n f o r m a t i o n  i m p l i e s  a  s m a l l e r  r e t u r n  f o r  t h e  s e c u r i t y  
m i g h t  s e l l  t h e  s e c u r i t y .  
To f o r m a l i z e  t h e  n o t i o n  o f  t r a d i n g  d u r i n g  t h e  p e r i o d ,  
c o n s i d e r  a  s i m p l e  s i t u a t i o n  i n v o l v i n g  one s e c u r i t y  a n d  two 
i n v e s t o r s ,  A a n d  B . ~  The t r a d i c g  mechanism i s  a  s e a l e d - b i d  
p r o c e d u r e  whereby t h e  two i n v e s t o r s  w r i t e  down f o r e c a s t s ,  
PA and  PB, o f  t h e  p r i c e ,  o r  v a l u e ,  o f  t h e  s e c u r i t y  a t  t h e  
end  o f  t h e  p e r i o d ,  a n d  t r a d i n g  o c c u r s  a t  a  p r i c e  mid-way 
be tween  t h e  two f o r e c a s t s .  I f  PA > PB, B  s e l l s  t h e  s e c u r i t y  
t o  A a t  a  p r i c e  o f  (PA + P  )/2, a n d  i f  PB > PA, A s e l l s  t c  B  
E a t  t h a t  p r i c e .  The amount o f  t h e  s e c u r i t y  t h a t  i s  t r a d e d  
is  n o t  i m p o r t a n t  f o r  o u r  p u r p o s e s ,  s o  i t  i s  assumed t h a t  j u s t  
one  u n i t  ( s h a r e )  o f  t h e  s e c u r i t y  changes  h a n d s .  A l t e r n a t i v e l y ,  
g i v e n  t h e  a s s u m p t i o n  t h a t  t h e  i n v e s t o r s  a r e  r i s k - n e u t r a l ,  
it  m i g h t  b e  n o r e  r e a l i s t i c  t o  assume t h a t  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  
s e l l i n g  t h e  s e c u r i t y  i n  t h i s  t r a d i n g  p r o c e d u r e  s e l l s  h i s  e n t i r e  
h o l d i n g s  o f  t h e  s e c u r i t y  ( a n d  would s e l l  more i f  it w e r e  n o t  
f o r  t h e  p r o h i b i t i o n  o f  s h o r t  s a l e s ) .  
The i n v e s t o r s '  f o r e c a s t s  c a n  b e  w r i t t e n  i n  t h e  fo rm 
PA = ? + uA and  PB = P  + uB, where  P  i s  t h e  a c t u a l  v a l u e  o f  
t h e  s e c u r i t y  a t  t h e  end  o f  t h e  p e r i o d  and uA and  uB a r e  e r r o r  
t e r m s .  Assuming t h a t  t h e  two i n v e s t o r s  a r e  k n o w l e d g e a b l e  
and  e x p e r i e n c e d  enough t o  a v o i d  s y s t e m a t i c  e r r o r s ,  s u p p o s e  
t h a t  u  = ( u A , u B )  h a s  a  b i v a r i a t e  normal  d i s t r i b u t i o n  w i t h  
2 2 E ( u A )  = E(uB)  = 0 ,  V(u ) = a A  , V(uB) = a B  , and  Cov(uA,uB) A 
= poAaB. Moreover ,  it  i s  assumed t h a t  t h i s  d i s t r i b u t i o n  is  
known t o  b o t h  t r a d e r s S 5  F o r  example ,  t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  c o u l d  b e  
based on c o n s i d e r a b l e  p a s t  d a t a  i n  t h e  form o f  f o r e c a s t s  
by A and B and t h e  co r r e spond ing  p r i c e  o b s e r v a t i o n s .  
A f t e r  A d e t e r m i n e s  PA b u t  b e f o r e  PB i s  known, A ' s  p r i o r  
d i s t r i b u t i o n  f o r  P  i s  a  normal d i s t r i b u t i o n  w i t h  mean PA and 
v a r i a n c e  u  2 A - A f t e r  l e a r n i n g  t h e  v a l u e  o f  PB, A ' s  p o s t e r i o r  
d i s t r i b u t i o n  f o r  P  i s  a  normal d i s t r i b u t i o n  w i t h  mean P i  and 
v a r i a n c e  u i C ,  where 
and 
w i t h  k = uB/uA.  The d e r i v a t i o n  o f  t h e  p o s t e r i o r  d i s t r i b u t i o n  
i s  g i v e n  i n  Appendix I. 
From t h i s  p o s t e r i o r  d i s t r i b u t i o n  and t h e  assumpt ion  
t h a t  t r a d i n g  o f  one u n i t  o f  t h e  s e c u r i t y  o c c u r s  a t  a  p r i c e  o f  
(PA + PB) /2 ,  A ' s  expec t ed  r e t u r n  from t h e  t r a d e ,  a s  de te rmined  
a f t e r  PA and PB a r e  known, i s  simply P i  - [ (pA t pB)/2]  i f  
P A  > PB ( i n  which c a s e  B s e l l s  t h e  s e c u r i t y  t o  A )  and 
~ ~ 
[(pA + pB) /2 ]  - P i  i f  PA < PB ( i n  which ca se  A s e l l s  t h e  
s e c u r i t y  t o  B ) .  Thus, A ' s  expected  r e t u r n  i s  
which s i m p l i f i e s  t o  
Obvious ly ,  ( k  + 1) > 0  ( s i n c e  k  = a  B /a  A > O ) , ( p A  - PB)> 0  i f  
PA > PB, and (PB - PA) > 0  i f  PA < PB. The term i n  t h e  
denominator ,  k2 - 2pk + 1, i s  nonnegat ive  i f  p - < ( k 2  + 1 ) / 2 k .  
But ( k 2  + 1 ) / 2 k  > 1, w i t h  e q u a l i t y  h o l d i n g  on ly  when k  = 1. 
Thus, k2 - 2pk + 1 > 0  excep t  when p = k  = 1, t h e  u n i n t e r e s t i n g  
c a s e  i n  which t h e r e  i s  no t r a d i n g  s i n c e  P A - = PB. A s  a  r e s u l t ,  
a l l  o f  t h e  f a c t o r s  of  nA a r e  s t r i c t l y  p o s i t i v e  excep t  f o r  k - 1, 
imply ing  t h a t  t h e  s i g n  o f  k  - 1 i s  t h e  s i g n  o f  nA: 
i f f  
R e c a l l i n g  t h a t  k  = a B / a A ,  we s e e  t h a t  A ' s  expec ted  
r e t u r n  from t h e  t r a d e  i s  p o s i t i v e  i f  aA < a B  and n e g a t i v e  
i f  a A  > a  B .  Moreover, s i n c e  A and B  s t a r t  w i t h  t h e  same 
j o i n t  d i s t r i b u t i o n  f o r  (PA ,PB) and s i n c e  t h e  t r a d i n g  p rocedure  
6 i s  a  zero-sum game, nB = -nA,  where nB r e p r e s e n t s  B ' s  
expec ted  r e t u r n  from t h e  t r a d e .  The re fo re ,  t h e  i n v e s t o r  
w i th  t h e  s m a l l e r  s t a n d a r d  d e v i a t i o n  of  f o r e c a s t  e r r o r  h a s  
a  p o s i t i v e  expec t ed  r e t u r n ,  whereas t h e  o t h e r  i n v e s t o r  h a s  
a  n e g a t i v e  e x p e c t e d  r e t u r n .  
The p r e c e d i n g  a n a l y s i s  assumes t h a t  t h e  e x p e c t e d  e r r o r  
o f  e a c h  i n v e s t o r ' s  f o r e c a s t  is  z e r o .  Suppose t h a t  E ( u  ) = v ,  A 
s o  t h a t  A ' s  f o r e c a s t s  h a v e  a  s y s t e m a t i c  e r r o r  o f  m a g n i t u d e  v  
i n  a d d i t i o n  t o  random e r r o r .  Tf e v e r y t h i n g  e l s e  i n  t h e  model  
i s  unchanged ,  t h e  e f f e c t  o f  t h i s  s y s t e m a t i c  e r r o r  i s  t o  change  
A ' s  p o s t e r i o r  mean t o  P i  - [k2(1 - p 2 ) v / ( k 2  - 2pk t I ) ] ,  where  
P* i s  t h e  p o s t e r i o r  mean when t h e  e x p e c t e d  e r r o r  o f  A i s  c a l i -  A 
b r a t e d  t o  z e r o .  The d i f f e r e n c e  i n  A ' s  e x p e c t e d  r e t u r n  
( u n c a l i b r a t e d  e x p e c t e d  r e t u r n  minus c a l i b r a t e d  e x p e c t e d  r e t u r n )  
i s  -6v when PA > PB and  6v when PA < P  where 
B  ' 
2  6  = k  (1 - p 2 ) / ( k 2  - 2pk + 1 ) .  B e f o r e  s e e i n g  PA and PB, how- 
e v e r ,  t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  PA - P  i s  normal  w i t h  mean v  and B  
2  
v a r i a n c e  a A 2  t a B  - 2paAaB. T r a n s f o r m i n g  t o  t h e  s t a n d a r d  
normal  d i s t r i b u t i o n ,  P r ( P A  > P  ) = P r  z  > - v / ( a A 2  t a  2  B  B  
- 2 ~ a ~ a ~ ) ~ / ~ ]  = Y c a n  b e found ,  i m p l y i n g  t h a t  b e f o r e  (PA,PB)  
i s  o b s e r v e d ,  t h e  u n c a l i b r a t e d  e x p e c t e d  r e t u r n  f c r  A i s  
-6vy + 6 v ( l  - y )  = 6 v ( l  - 2 y ) .  But  6  i s  s t r i c t l y  p o s i t i v e  and 
v ( l  - 2y) < 0 i f  v  0 ,  s i n c e  v  > 0  i m p l i e s  . 5  < y < 1 a n d .  
v  < 0  i m p l i e s  0  < y < . 5 .  T h e r e f o r e ,  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  i n  e x p e c t e d  
r e t u r n s  i s  n e g a t i v e ,  i n d i c a t i n g  t h a t  it  i s  b e t t e r  f o r  A t o  b e  
c a l i b r a t e d  t h a n  t o  b e  u n c a l i b r a t e d .  C a l i b r a t i n g  i s  a d v a n t a g e o u s  
t o  a n  u n c a l i b r a t e d  i n v e s t o r ,  and a  c a l i b r a t e d  i n v e s t o r  d i m i n i s h e s  
h i s  e x p e c t e d  r e t u r n  by i n t e n t i o n a l l y  u n c a l i b r a t i n g ,  o r  h e d g i n g .  
I n  t h e  s e a l e d - b i d  t r a d i n g  p r o c e d u r e ,  t h e n ,  a  c a l i b r a t e d  
i n v e s t o r  w i t h  a  s m a l l  f o r e c a s t  e r r o r  v a r i a n c e  h a s  a n  a d v a n t a g e  
o v e r  a n  u n c a l i b r a t e d  i n v e s t o r  w i t h  a  l a r g e r  e r r o r  v a r i a n c e .  
Moreover, t h e  e s s e n t i a l  n a t u r e  o f  t h i s  r e s u l t  g e n e r a l i z e s  t o  
a  s ea l ed -b id  t r a d i n g  p rocedure  w i t h  n  t r a d e r s ,  where n  > 2 .  
Thi s  i s  i l l u s t r a t e d  i n  Appendix I1 f o r  t h e  s p e c i a l  c a s e  i n  
which t h e  e r r o r s  o f  t h e  d i f f e r e n t  f o r e c a s t e r s  a r e  i ndependen t .  
A s  new i n f o r m a t i o n  c o n t i n u a l l y  appea r s  i n  t h e  marke t ,  
i n v e s t o r s  w i l l  c o n t i n u a l l y  r e p e a t  t h e  t r a d i n g  p rocedure .  
Because o f  d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  e i t h e r  t h e  amount o f  i n f o r m a t i o n  
o b t a i n e d  o r  t h e  i n f e r e n c e s  drawn from t h e  i n f o r m a t i o n ,  some 
i n d i v i d u a l s  w i l l  e a r n  t r a d i n g  p r o f i t s  wh i l e  o t h e r s  w i l l  
s u f f e r  t r a d i n g  l o s s e s .  R a t i o n a l  i n v e s t o r s  who c o n t i n u e  t o  
e a r n  l e s s  by t r a d i n g  t h a n  they  would have ea rned  by a  
buy-and-hold s t r a t e g y  w i l l  e v e n t u a l l y  s t o p  t r a d i n g .  Other  
i n v e s t o r s ,  who were p r e v i o u s l y  t r a d i n g  s u c c e s s f u l l y ,  may 
now f i n d  t h a t  t hey  a r e  s u f f e r i n g  t r a d i n g  l o s s e s  a s  a  r e s u l t  
o f  t r a d i n g  only  w i t h  s u p e r i o r  f o r e c a s t e r s ,  and they  w i l l  
e v e n t u a l l y  d e s i s t  from t r a d i n g  a l s o .  The p r o c e s s  w i l l  b e  
r e p e a t e d  u n t i l  on ly  t h e  most s u c c e s s f u l  t r a d e r  d e s i r e s  t o  
t r a d e .  
It i s  p o s s i b l e  t h a t  r a t i o n a l  i n v e s t o r s  w i t h  o p t i m i s t i c  
e x p e c t a t i o n s  of t h e i r  f u t u r e  t r a d i n g  performance w i l l  c o n t i n u e  
t o  t r a d e  i n  s p i t e  o f  i n i t i a l  t r a d i n g  l o s s e s .  Th i s  could  be  
caused  by m i s p e r c e p t i o n s  of  t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  f o r e c a s t  
e r r o r s .  However, o u r  model s p e c i f i e s  a  con t inuous  f low o f  i n  
i n f o r m a t i o n  w i t h  no t r a n s a c t i o n  c o s t s .  Each i n d i v i d u a l  w i l l  
t r a d e  c o n t i n u o u s l y  and t h e  r e s u l t s  o f  t h e  i n f i n i t e  number of  
t r a d e s  imp l i ed  by t h i s  p r o c e s s  should  "swamp" t h e  i n i t i a l  
p r i o r  judgments .  Thus, i n  a  r a t i o n a l  world where i n d i v i d u a l s  
form r e l i a b l e  judgments conce rn ing  t h e i r  t r a d i n g  p r o f i c i e n c y  
ove r  t ime ,  t h e r e  should  be  no s p e c u l a t i v e  t r a d i n g .  8 
The s i t u a t i o n  could  be  compl ica ted  by assuming t h a t  some 
i n d i v i d u a l s  a r e  a d e p t  a t  t r a d i n g  i n  c e r t a i n  i n d u s t r i e s  o r  
w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  c e r t a i n  i n f o r m a t i o n .  I n  t h f s  c a s e ,  i n d i v i d u a l s  
would form e x p e c t a t i o n s  of  t h e i r  t r a d i n g  p r o f i c i e n c y  f o r  i n d i -  
v i d u a l  c a t e g o r i e s  o f  t r a d i n g .  Again, on ly  t h e  most p r o f i c i e n t  
w i l l  remain i n  each  c a t e g o r y ,  and no t r a d i n g  w i l l  r e s u l t .  It 
may a p p e a r  p a r a d o x i c a l  t h a t  a n  i n v e s t o r  who p o s s e s s e s  informa- 
t i o n  can expec t  t o  e a r n  a  h i g h e r  r e t u r n  by i g n o r i n g  t h e  i n f o r -  
mat ion  t h a n  by t r a d i n g  on i t .  However, t h e  f a c t  t h a t  two 
i n v e s t o r s  a r e  a b l e  t o  t r a d e  i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  t h e y  d i f f e r  i n  
t h e i r  f o r e c a s t s .  I n  t r a d i n g  w i t h  a n  i n d i v i d u a l  who i s  a  
b e t t e r  f o r e c a s t e r  (because  o f  d i f f e r e n t  i n f o r m a t i o n  o r  because  
o f  o t h e r  r e a s o n s ) ,  a n  i n v e s t o r  i s  a t  a  d i s a d v a n t a g e ,  a s  t h e  
model p r e s e n t e d  i n  t h i s  s e c t i o n  shows. 
I m p l i c a t i o n s  Concerning t h e  Value and P roduc t ion  
o f  I n f o r m a t i o n  
Recent  models conce rn ing  t h e  v a l u e  o f  and t h e  p r o d u c t i o n  
o f  i n f o r m a t i o n 9  imply t h a t  i n f o r m a t i o n  i s  v a l u a b l e  f o r  t r a d i n g  
pu rposes ,  i n  a d d i t i o n  t o  i t s  u s e f u l n e s s  i n  t h e  a l l o c a t i o n  o f  
i nves tmen t  i n  r e a l  a s s e t s .  Fur thermore ,  t h e s e  models s u g g e s t  
t h a t  i n d i v i d u a l s  w i l l  commit r e a l  r e s o u r c e s  t o  i n f o r m a t i o n  
p r o d u c t i o n ,  e i t h e r  f o r  t h e i r  own p r i v a t e  t r a d i n g  a c t i v i t i e s  
o r  f o r  s a l e  t o  o t h e r  i n f o r m a t i o n  t r a d e r s .  Manne a p p a r e n t l y  
approves  o f  t h i s  i n f o r m a t i o n  p r o d u c t i o n ,  a s  he  s t a t e s  t h a t  
o p p o r t u n i t i e s  f o r  t r a d i n g  on s p e c i a l  i n f o r m a t i o n  can  be  a 
s u c c e s s f u l  inducement t o  t h e  s a t i s f a c t o r y  performance of 
b u s i ~ e s s  e x e c u t i v e s .  Converse ly ,  Fama-Laffer and H i r s h l e i f e r  
b e l i e v e  t h a t  t h e  p r o d u c t i o n  of  i n f o r m a t i o n  f o r  t r a d i n g  pu rposes  
need not  be Pa re to -op t ima l .  They s t a t e  t h a t  t h e  p roduc t ion  
o f  i n f o r m a t i o n  f o r  t r a d i n g  purposes  employs r e a l  r e s o u r c e s ,  
wh i l e  l e a d i n g  t o  a  mere r e d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  a s s e t s .  
I n  o r d e r  t o  h i g h l i g h t  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e s  between o u r  r e s u l t s  
and t h o s e  o f  o t h e r  a u t h o r s ,  we d e f i n e  t h e  " f u l l  va lue"  o f  
a  p i e c e  o f  i n f o r m a t i o n  p e r t a i n i n g  t o  a n  i n d i v i d u a l  s e c u r i t y  
a s  t h e  p roduc t  o f  (1) t h e  change i n  t h e  s e c u r i t y ' s  p r i c e  
upon r e l e a s e  o f  t h e  i n f o r m a t i o n  and ( 2 )  t h e  number of  s h a r e s  
o u t s t a n d i n g .  Th i s  term co r r e sponds  t o  V ,  t h e  change i n  t h e  
v a l u e  o f  t h e  f i r m  due t o  i n f o r m a t i o n  i n  t h e  Fama-Laffer ,paper .  
Fama and L a f f e r  p o s t u l a t e  a  model o f  r i s k - n e u t r a l  i n d i v i d u a l s  
where each  i n d i v i d u a l  i s  w i l l i n g  e i t h e r  t o  buy o r  t o  s e l l  
s h a r e s  i n  a  s e c u r i t y  a t  a  g i v e n  p r i c e .  Here a n  i n d i v i d u a l  
who r e c e i v e s  i n f o r m a t i o n  f a v o r a b l e  t o  a  s e c u r i t y  can  buy a l l  
o f  t h e  s h a r e s  of  a  s e c u r i t y  a t  t h e  market  p r i c e  and s u b s e q u e n t l y  
r e l e a s e  t h e  i n f o r m a t i o n  t o  r e a p  i t s  f u l l  v a l u e .  1 0  
I n  t h e  model o f  t h e  p r e v i o u s  s e c t i o n ,  we saw t h a t  d u r i n g  
t h e  p e r i o d  a l l  t r a d i n g  would e v e n t u a l l y  s t o p .  Should a n  i n d i -  
v i d u a l  o b t a i n  i n f o r m a t i o n  d u r i n g  t h e  p e r i o d  conce rn ing  t h e  
v a l u e  o f  s e c u r i t i e s ,  h e  would d e s i r e  t o  t r a d e  on t h e  b a s i s  of 
i t .  However, no one would be  w i l l i n g  t o  t r a d e  w i t h  him. A s  
i n f o r m a t i o n  would be  of no v a l u e  f o r  t r a d i n g  s e c u r i t i e s  i n  t h e  
p e r i o d ,  t h e r e  would be no i n f o r m a t i o n  p r o d u c t i o n  f o r  t r a d i n g  
purposes .  A t  l e a s t  i n  t h e  c a s e  of  a  p u r e l y  s p e c u l a t i v e  
marke t ,  t h e  movement away from P a r e t o - o p t i m a l i t y  due  t o  
i n f o r m a t i o n  p r o d u c t i o n  shown by Fama and L a f f e r  can  be c o r r e c t e d  
by a  c u r t a i l i n g  of  t r a d i n g .  
A s  t h e  a n a l y s i s  o f  H i r s h l e i f e r  i s  p r e s e n t e d  i n  a  t ime-  
s t a t e  p r e f e r e n c e  model,  he d i s c u s s e s  t h e  t r a d i n g  of  a c t u a l  
consumption c l a i m s ,  a s  opposed t o  ou r  u s e  of on ly  c l a ims  on 
s e c u r i t i e s .  S i n c e  H i r s h l e i f e r  d i d  no t  a t t e m p t  t o  s e p a r a t e  
l i q u i d i t y  mo t ives  from s p e c u l a t i v e  mot ives  i n  h i s  model,  
t r a d i n g  e x i s t s  i n  h i s  economy. For example, consumption- 
inves tment  d e c i s i o n s  can  be viewed a s  l i q u i d i t y  d e c i s i o n s ,  s o  
t h a t  consumption c l a i m s  i n  d i f f e r e n t  p e r i o d s  may be t r a d e d ,  
even  by unknowledgeable i n v e s t o r s .  To s e e  t h i s ,  imagine a  
two-per iod ,  two-person economy where B on ly  h o l d s  c l a i m s  t o  
c e r t a i n  consumption i n  p e r i o d  1 and A on ly  h o l d s  c l a i m s  t o  
u n c e r t a i n  consurcption i n  p e r i o d  2 .  Also assume t h a t  A i s  
more knowledgeable t h a n  B conce rn ing  t h e  amount of  consumption 
t o  be r e c e i v e d  i n  p e r i o d  2 .  B can expec t  t h a t ,  i n  t h e  normal 
c a s e ,  A w i l l  t r a d e  away fewer  p e r i o d  2 c l a ims  when he e x p e c t s  
t h e  r e t u r n  i n  p e r i o d  2 t o  be  h i g h  t h a n  when he  e x p e c t s  t h e  
r e t u r n  i n  p e r i o d  2 t o  be low. I n  s p i t e  of t h i s ,  B may d e c i d e  
t o  t r a d e  w i t h  A i n  o r d e r  n o t  t o  s t a r v e  i n  p e r i o d  2 .  I n  a  
s i m i l a r  f a s h i o n ,  i t  can be  shown t h a t  consumption c l a ims  
c o n t i n g e n t  on d i f f e r e n t  s t a t e s  i n  t h e  same p e r i o d  may be  
t r a d e d  f o r  l i q u i d i t y  p u r p o s e s .  
It i s  assumed i n  o u r  model t h a t  each i n d i v i d u a l  b r i n g s  
ca sh  and c l a i m s  on s e c u r i t i e s  t o  t h e  a u c t i o n  a t  t h e  beg inn ing  
of  t h e  p e r i o d  and t h a t  each  i n d i v i d u a l  must make a  consumption- 
i nves tmen t  d e c i s i o n  a t  t h a t  t ime .  Hence, o u r  r e s u l t s  p a r a l l e l  
t h o s e  o f  H i r s h l e i f e r  a t  t h i s  p o i n t ,  a s  even unknowledgeable 
i n v e s t o r s  may t r a d e  a t  t h e  tatonnement  a u c t i o n .  S i n c e  t r a d i n g  
o c c u r s ,  i n f o r m a t i o n  i s  o f  v a l u e  and w i l l  be produced.  Along 
t h e  l i n e s  sugges t ed  by ~ i r s h l e i f e r , "  we can  show t h a t  t h i s  
i n f o r m a t i o n  p r o d u c t i o n  i s  no t  n e c e s s a r i l y  Pa re to -op t ima l .  
Cons ider  a  s i t u a t i o n  i n  which a l l  i n d i v i d u a l s  have  i d e n t i d a l  
h o l d i n g s  of  c a s h  and t h e  market  p o r t f o l i o  p r i o r  t o  t h e  t a -  
tonnement p r o c e s s ,  p o s s e s s  i d e n t i c a l  u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n s ,  and 
have homogeneous e x p e c t a t i o n s  w i th  r e g a r d  t o  t h e  b e h a v i o r  o f  
t h e  market  p o r t f o l i o .  Fur thermore ,  suppose  t h a t  one u n i t  
o f  a d d i t i o n a l  i n foma t ion  may be  purchased  a t  a  s m a l l  p o s i t i v e  
c o s t .  Though each  pe r son  might pu rchase  i t ,  no t r a d e s  w i l l  
r e s u l t  s i n c e  a l l  i n i t i a l l y  h e l d  i d e n t i c a l  p o r t f o l i o s .  The 
i n f o r m a t i o n  l e a d s  t o  no a c t i o n ,  s o  i t  i s  of  no v a l u e .  A s  
o u r  m3del i m p l i e s  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  t r a d i n g ,  i n f o r m a t i o n  
p r o d u c t i o n ,  and non-op t ima l i t y ,  o u r  r e s u l t s  from t h e  ta tonnement  
p r o c e s s  do n o t  d i f f e r  from t h o s e  o f  H i r s h l e i f e r .  
Thus, t r a d i n g  and non-optimal  i n f o r m a t i o n  p r o d u c t i o n  
r e s u l t  from l i q u i d i t y  m o t i v e s .  They would n o t ,  however, a r i s e  
i n  a  p u r e l y  s p e c u l a t i v e  market  such  a s  t h e  one o c c u r i n g  i n  
o u r  model a f t e r  t h e  a u c t i o n .  T h e r e f o r e ,  t h o s e  models o f  
p u r e l y  s p e c u l a t i v e  marke t s  which imply t r a d i n g  and i n f o r m a t i o n  
p r o d u c t i o n  i g n o r e  t h a t  t h e  r a t i o n a l  a c t i o n  o f  n a i v e  i n v e s t o r s  
i n  t h e  p re sence  o f  informed t r a d e r s  i s  t o  c u r t a i l  t r a d i n g .  
Of c o u r s e ,  we r e c o g n i z e  t h a t  l i q u i d i t y  t r a d i n g  e x i s t s  i n  t h e  
r e a l  w o r l d ,  s o  we d o  n o t  s u g g e s t  t h a t  o u r  r e s u l t s  h a v e  p r e -  
d i c t i v e  c o n t e n t .  However, a t  a n y  g i v e n  moment, t h e  number o f  
i n v e s t o r s  d e s i r i n g  t o  t r a d e  d u e  t o  l i q u i d i t y  m o t i v e s  i s  p r o b a b l y  
small, s o  t h a t  e v e n  w i t h o u t  t r a n s a c t i o n  c o s t s ,  i n v e s t o r s  can-  
n o t  b e  e x p e c t e d  t o  e a r n  t h e  f u l l  v a l u e  o f  t h e i r  i n f o r m a t i o n .  
4 .  S p e c u l a t i v e  T r a d i n g  w i t h  a S p e c i a l i s t  
A model where  i n d i v i d u a l s  t r a d e  s e c u r i t i e s  d i r e c t l y  w i t h  
e a c h  o t h e r  was p r e s e n t e d  i n  S e c t i o n  2.  HoNever, i n  t h e  r e a l  
w o r l d ,  i n d i v i d u a l s  u s u a l l y  t r a d e  s e c u r i t i e s  i n d i r e c t l y  t h r o u g h  
a b r c k e r  and  a s p e c i a l i s t .  The b r o k e r ,  who i s  r e s p o n s i b l e  
f o r  e x e c u t i n g  t r a n s a c t i o n s  i n  t h e  i n v e s t o r ' s  name ( a s  w e l l  as 
f o r  p r o v i d i n g  a d v i c e ) ,  i s  compensated by a  commiss ion .  A s  
o r d e r s  t o  t r a n s a c t  i n  a p a r t i c u l a r  s e c u r i t y  o c c u r  i r r e g u l a r l y ,  
i n v e s t o r s  who d e s i r e  t o  buy ( s e l l )  c a n n o t  b e  c e r t a i n  o f  l o c a t -  
i n g  i n v e s t o r s  who want  t o  s e l l  ( b u y )  i m m e d i a t e l y .  To i n s u r e  
t h a t  i n d i v i d u a l s  c a n  t r a n s a c t  p r o m p t l y ,  t h e  s p e c i a l i s t  s t a n d s  
r e a d y  t o  buy s h a r e s  o f  t h e  s e c u r i t y  a t  a s p e c i f i e d  p r i c e  
( b i d  p r i c e )  and t o  s e l l  s h a r e s  o f  t h e  s e c u r i t y  a t  a n o t h e r  
s p e c i f i e d  p r i c e  ( a s k  p r i c e ) .  The s p e c i a l i s t  i s  compensated 
by t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  b e t w e e n  t h e  a s k  p r i c e  and t h e  b i d  p r i c e ,  
which i s  commonly c a l l e d  t h e  s p r e a d .  
Though t h e  s p e c i a l i s t  and b r o k e r  a r e  compensa ted  i n  
p r o p o r t i o n  t o  t h e  t r a d i n g  v o l u m e ,  t h e  s p e c i a l i s t  i s  a l s o  corn: 
p e n s a t e d  a c c o r d i n g  t o  h i s  a b i l i t y  t o  f o r e c a s t  t h e  f u t u r e  p r i c e  
o f  a s e c u r i t y .  The b i d  and a s k  p r i c e s  c a n  b e  viewed a s ' t h e  
s p e c i a l i s t s '  f o r e c a s t s .  I n v e s t o r s  who p o s s e s s  i n f o r m a t i o n  un- 
a v a i l a b l e  t o  t h e  s p e c i a l i s t  i m p l y i n g  a c e r t a i n  r i s e  i n  t h e  
p r i c e  o f  t h e  s e c u r i t y  w i l l  p u r c h a s e  t h e  s e c u r i t y  f r o m  t h e  
s p e c i a l i s t  and  w i l l  s u b s e q u e n t l y  r e a p  g a i n s  a t  t h e  s p e c i a l i s t s '  
e x p e n s e .  The mode l  o f  S e c t i o n  2  i m p l i e s  t h a t  i n d i v i d u a l s  
s h o u l d  e v e n t u a l l y  s t o p  t r a d i n g  f o r  s p e c u l a t i v e  r e a s o n s .  How- 
e v e r ,  a  w o r l d  w h e r e  s p e c i a l i s t s  c a n n o t  d e s i s t  f r o m  t r a d i n g  
w i t h  i n f o r m e d  i n v e s t o r s  may y i e l d  d i f f e r e n t  r e s u l t s .  
To f o r m a l i z e  t h e  n o t i o n  o f  t r a d i n g  w i t h  a  s p e c i a l i s t ,  
a s sume  t h e  same mode l  p r e s e n t e d  i n  S e c t i o n  2 ,  b u t  l e t  A 
r e p r e s e n t  a n  i n v e s t o r  and l e t  B  r e p r e s e n t  t h e  s p e c i a l i s t .  
I n s t e a d  o f  a  s e a l e d - b i d  t r a d i n g  p r o c e d u r e ,  A s e e s  PB b e f o r e  
mak ing  a  t r a d i n g  d e c i s i o n .  A c a n  buy t h e  s e c u r i t y  a t  a  p r i c e  
o f  P  + T, s e l l  t h e  s e c u r i t y  a t  a p r i c e  o f  PB - T ,  o r  d o  
B 
n o t h i n g .  The d i f f e r e n c e  b e t w e e n  PB and  t h e  p r i c e s  a t  w h i c h  
A c a n  t r a d e  r e p r e s e n t s  t h e  s p r e a d  a n d / o r  c o m i s s i o n .  O b v i o u s l y  
T i s  n o n n e g a t i v e ,  w i t h  T  = 0  c o r r e s p o n d i n g  t o  t h e  c a s e  i n  w h i c h  
A c a n  buy - o r s e l l  a t  PB, t h e  p r i c e  s e t  by t h e  s p e c i a l i s t  
( i . e .  t h e  s p e c i a l i s t ' s  f o r e c a s t  o f  t h e  v a l u e  o f  t h e  s e c u r i t y ) .  
From t h e  model i n  S e c t i o n  2 ,  A ' s  p o s t e r i o r  d i s t r i b u t i o n  
o f  P  a f t e r  A o b s e r v e s  PB i s  a  n o r m a l  d i s t r i b u t i o n  w i t h  mean 
P i  and v a r i a n c e  o i 2 .  The e x p e c t e d  r e t u r n  t o  A f rom b u y i n g  
t h e  s e c u r i t y  i s  P i  - (PB + T ) ,  s o  i t  i s  o p t i m a l  f o r  A t o  buy 
when P i  - (PB + T) > 0. From S e c t i o n  2,  t h i s  i s  e q u i v a l e n t  t o  
which s i m p l i f i e s  t o  
PA - PA > BT i f k - p > 0  
and 
where 
k* B = -  k k - p  
I f  k  - p > 0 ,  s o  t h a t  t h e  c o r r e l a t i o n  between PA and PB 
i s  s m a l l e r  t h a n  U ~ / U ~ ,  t h e  expec ted  r e t u r n  t o  A from buying  
t h e  s e c u r i t y  i s  p o s i t i v e  when PA - PB i s  g r e a t e r  t h a n  a  c e r t a i n  
p o s i t i v e  m u l t i p l e  o f  T. Th i s  f o l l o w s  from t h e  f a c t  t h a t  B > 0 .  
The l a r g e r  B i s ,  t h e  l a r g e r  t h e  p r i c e  d i f f e r e n c e  t h a t  i s  r e -  
q u i r e d  b e f o r e  i t  i s  advantageous  f o r  A t o  buy t h e  s e c u r i t y .  
The c a s e  o f  B = 1, o f  c o u r s e ,  co r r e sponds  t o  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  
i n  which t h e  breakeven  v a l u e  o f  PA - PB i s  e x a c t l y  e q u a l  t o  T .  
The r e l a t i o n s h i p  among B ,  p ,  and k  i s  a s  f o l l o w s  when 
k - p > O :  
i f f  
T h i s  can  be s e e n  by w r i t i n g  B i n  t h e  form 1 + [ ( l  - p k ) /  
(k2  - pk)]. The denominator  of t h e  second te rm i s  s t r i c t l y  
p o s i t i v e  ( s i n c e  k  > p ) ,  s o  t h e  s i g n  o f  t h e  second term i s  
simply t h e  s i g n  o f  1 - pk. But i t  might  be expec ted  t h a t  t h e  
s p e c i a l i s t  i s  a  b e t t e r  f o r e c a s t e r  ( i n  t h e  s e n s e  o f  hav ing  a  
s m a l l e r  e r r o r  v a r i a n c e )  t h a n  most i n v e s t o r s ,  i n  which c a s e  
aB  < aA,  o r  k  < 1. I f  k < 1, t h e n  l / k  > 1, s o  p < l / k  by 
d e f i n i t i o n ,  imply ing  t h a t  f? > 1. Even i f  A h a s  a  s m a l l e r  
e r r o r  v a r i a n c e  t h a n  t h e  s p e c i a l i s t ,  B w i l l  s t i l l  be g r e a t e r  
t h a n  one u n l e s s  t h e  c o r r e l a t i o n  i s  l a r g e  enough s o  t h a t  
p 2 a A / a B .  Th i s  i m p l i e s  t h a t  when A has  a  s m a l l e r  v a r i a n c e  
t h a n  t h e  s p e c i a l i s t  - and t h e  c c r r e l a t i o n  i s  l a r g e r  t h a n  a  / a  A B' 
A can  t a k e  advan tage  of h i s  s u p e r i o r  f o r e c a s t i n g  a b i l i t y  and 
o b t a i n  a  p o s i t i v e  expec t ed  r e t u r n  even i n  some c a s e s  where 
PA - PB < T .  I n  most s i t u a t i o n s ,  however, we would expec t  
t o  s e e  B > 1. Moreover, i f  k  - < 1, dB/dk < 0 ,  imp ly ing  t h a t  
i n c r e a s e s  a s  t h e  s p e c i a l i s t  becomes a  b e t t e r  f o r e c a s t e r  ( i n  
te rms  o f  t h e  r a t i o  of e r r o r  v a r i a n c e s )  r e l a t i v e  t o  t h e  i n v e s t o r .  
I f  k  - p < 0 ,  t h e n  B < 0 ,  and t h e  o p t i m a l  buying  r u l e  i s  
t o  buy i f  PA - PB < BT < 0 .  T h i s  seems t o  be a  s t r a n g e  r e s u l t ;  
A should  buy t h e  s e c u r i t y  when PA - P i s  n e g a t i v e  enough! B 
Noting t h a t  k  < 0 ( 1, we s e e  t h a t  t h e  s p e c i a l i s t  ha s  a  s m a l l e r  
e r r o r  v a r i a n c e  t h a n  A ,  and p i s  h i g h  enough t h a t  i t  i s  h i g h l y  
l i k e l y  t h a t  PA i s  on t h e  same s i d e  of P a s  i s  P b u t  t h a t  PA B 
i s  f u r t h e r  from P .  For  i n s t a n c e ,  i f  k  < 1 and p = 1, A knows 
t h a t  P A  i s  on t h e  wrong s i d e  of PB, s o  A u t i l i z e s  t h i s  informa- 
t i o n  t o  buy when PA < PB. I n  t h i s  s i t u a t i o n ,  P i  = (pB - k P A ) /  
(1 - k ) ,  and P i  - PB and PA - PB a r e  o f  o p p o s i t e  s i g n .  
The s i t u a t i o n  i n  which A s e l l s  t h e  s e c u r i t y  is  ana logous  
t o  t h e  buying  s i t u a t i o n .  The expec ted  r e t u r n  t o  A from s e l l i n g  
i s  p o s i t i v e  when 
T h u s ,  c o m b i n i n g  t h e  b u y i n g  and  s e l l i n g  s i t u a t i o n s ,  A h a s  a  
p o s i t i v e  e x p e c t e d  r e t u r n  ( i . e .  A w i l l  t r a d e )  w h e n e v e r  
I f  k - p > 0 ,  wha t  i s  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y ,  c a l c u l a t e d  b e f o r e  
s e e i n g  PA a n d  PB, t h a t  A w i l l  t r a d e ?  T h i s  p r o b a b i l i t y  i s  
P r ( ( P A  - PBl > BT), w h i c h  by symmetry  i s  e q u a l  t o  2 P r ( P A  - PB 
> BT).  S i n c e  PA - PB i s  n o r m a l l y  d i s t r i b u t e d  w i t h  mean z e r o  
2 2 a n d  v a r i a n c e  U 
+ a B  - 2paAoB = o A  ( k 2  - 2pk + l ) ,  t h e  A 
p r o b a b i l i t y  t h a t  A w i l l  t r a d e  c a n  b e  w r i t t e n  i n  t h e  f o r m  
2 P r [ z  > ( K ~  - 2pk + l ~ ' / ~ ~ k - ' ( k  - p)- lc iA-l ] . ,  where  z i s  a  
s t a n d a r d  n o r m a l  random v a r i a b l e .  L e t t i n g  T r e p r e s e n t  t h e  
p r o b a b i l i t y  t h a t  A w i l l  t r a d e  a n d  l e t t i n g  
8 = ( k 2  - 2pL  + 1) ' I2Tk - l ( k  - p ) - l o A - l  , we s e e  t h a t  
a ~ / a T  = ( a ~ / a e ) ( a e / a ~ ) .  ~ u t  a ~ / a e  < o and a 0 / a ~  > 0, s o  that  
T i s  a d e c r e a s i n g  f u n c t i o n  o f  T, a s  would b e  e x p e c t e d .  More- 
o v e r ,  aB/ak  < 0 ,  i m p l y i n g  t h a t  T i s  a n  i n c r e a s i n g  f u n c t i o n  o f  
k .  A s  A ' S  e r r o r  v a r i a n c e  d e c r e a s e s  r e l a t i v e  t o  t h e  s p e c i a l i s t ' s  
e r r o r  v a r i a n c e ,  A i s  more l i k e l y  t o  t r a d e .  The appea rance  
o f  oA- l  i n  t h e  e x p r e s s i o n  f o r  0  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  w i t h  a l l  o t h e r  
v a r i a b l e s  h e l d  c o n s t a n t ,  a  s m a l l e r  oA makes t r a d i n g  l e s s  
l i k e l y .  But " a l l  o t h e r  v a r i a b l e s  h e l d  c o n s t a n t "  means t h a t  
2  k ,  a  f u n c t i o n  o f  oA , i s  h e l d  c o n s t a n t ,  s o  t h a t  oB2 d e c r e a s e s  
a s  o A 2 d e c r e a s e s .  The i n c r e a s e d  p r e c i s i o n  o f  bo th  A and t h e  
s p e c i a l i s t  means t h a t  t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  PA - PB i s  t i g h t e r .  
But T  i s  be ing  h e l d  c o n s t a n t ,  imp ly ing  t h a t  PA - PB i s  l e s s  
l i k e l y  t o  overcome t h e  sp read  a n d / o r  t r a n s a c t i o n  c o s t s .  I f  
og/oU i s  s u b s t i t u t e d  f o r  k  i n  t h e  e x p r e s s i o n  f o r  0 ,  d i f f e r e n t i -  
a t i o n  y i e l d s  aO/aoA > 0 ,  which i m p l i e s  t h a t  a ? / aoA < 0 .  There-  
f o r e ,  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  t h a t  A w i l l  t r a d e  i s  a  d e c r e a s i n g  
f u n c t i o n  o f  oAL,  a s  would be expec t ed .  
The above r e s u l t s  imply t h a t  any i n v e s t o r  w i t h  some 
i n f o r m a t i o n ,  no m a t t e r  how l i t t l e ,  can p r o f i t  from t h a t  
i n f o r m a t i o n  by employing a d e c i s i o n  r u l e  such  a s  t h e  one 
a r r i v e d  a t  by t h e  model o f  t h i s  s e c t i o n .  A l l  i n v e s t o r s  
have a  p o s i t i v e  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  t r a d i n g  w i t h  t h e  s p e c i a l i s t  
( i . e .  a  p o s i t i v e  p r o b i l i t y  o f  e n c o u n t e r i n g  a  s i t u a t i o n  
w i t h  a  p o s i t i v e  e x p e c t e d  r e t u r n  from buying  o r  s e l l i n g  
a t  t h e  p r i c e s  o f f e r e d  by t h e  s p e c i a l i s t ) .  However, t h e  
p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  t r a d i n g  i s  a  d e c r e a s i n g  f u n c t i o n  o f  t h e  
i n v e s t o r ' s  v a r i a n c e  o f  e r r o r  o f  e s t i m a t i o n .  The more 
a c c u r a t e l y  an i n d i v i d u a l  f o r e c a s t s  t h e  p r i c e  o f  a  s e c u r i t y  
and t h e  s m a l l e r  T  i s ,  t h e  more l i k e l y  i t  i s  t h a t  a  t r a d e  
w i l l  o c c u r .  Thus,  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  t r a d i n g  i s  a  f u n c t i o n  
o f  t h e  d e g r e e  o f  i n f o r m a t i o n  t h a t  t h e  i n v e s t o r  p o s s e s s e s .  
F o r  i n v e s t o r s  w i t h  l i t t l e  i n f o r m a t i o n ,  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  
t r a d i n g  i s  s m a l l  ( i . e .  t h e  number o f  o p p o r t u n i t i e s  f o r  
p r o f i t a b l e  t r a d i n g  i s  s m a l l ) .  On t h e  o t h e r  hand ,  f o r  
v e r y  knowledgeab le  i n v e s t o r s ,  t h e  number o f  o p p o r t u n i t i e s  
f o r  p r o f i t a b l e  t r a d i n g  may b e  l a r g e .  The volume o f  t r a d i n g  
w i l l  depend on  t h e  f o r e c a s t i n g  a b i l i t i e s  o f  t h e  i n v e s t o r s  
r e l a t i v e  t o  t h a t  o f  t h e  s p e c i a l i s t .  
The r e s u l t s  o f  t h e  model o f  t h i s  s e c t i o n  d i f f e r  f rom t h o s e  
o f  t h e  model o f  S e c t i o n  2,  where  i n d i v i d u a l s  w i t h  l a r g e  v a r i -  
a n c e s  o f  e s t i m a t i o n  e r r o r  c a n  e x p e c t  t o  l o s e  i n  t r a d i n g  w i t h  
i n d i v i d u a l s  w i t h  s m a l l  v a r i a n c e s  o f  e s t i m a t i o n  e r r o r .  The 
key d i f f e r e n c e  i n  t h e  two models ,  c f  c o u r s e ,  i n v o l v e s  t h e  
t r a d i n g  p r o c e d u r e .  I n  t h i s  s e c t i o n ,  t h e  s p e c i a l i s t  i s  f o r c e d  
t o  s e t  p r i c e s  a t  which any  i n v e s t o r  c a n  buy and  s e l l  t h e  
s e c u r i t y .  An i n v e s t o r  c a n  o b s e r v e  t h e s e  p r i c e s  and  r e v i s e  
h i s  judgments  c o n c e r n i n g  P b e f o r e  d e c i d i n g  w h e t h e r  t o  t r a d e .  
F u r t h e r m o r e ,  h e  can d e t e r m i n e  a  d e c i s i o n  r u l e  s u c h  a s  t h e  
f o l l o w i n g :  buy o n l y  i f  PA - 2 i s  l a r g e r  t h a n  a  c e r t a i n  B 
b r e a k e v e n  p o i n t  and s e l l  o n l y  i f  PB - PA i s  l a r g e r  t h a n  a n o t h e r  
b r e a k e v e n  p o i n t .  I n  t h e  s e a l e d - b i d  t r a d i n g  p r o c e d u r e ,  t h e  
i n v e s t o r  i s  n o t  a b l e  t o  s e e  PB b e f o r e  d e c i d i n g  w h e t h e r  o r  n o t  
t o  t r a d e .  A's d e c i s i o n  must b e  made b e f o r e  PB i s  known, and 
t h e  two f o r e c a s t s ,  PA and  PB, j o i n t l y  d e t e r m i n e  t h e  d e t a i l s  
o f  t h e  t r a d e .  
Because t h e  m a r k e t  maker ( s p e c i a l i s t )  c a n  e x p e c t  t o  l o s e  
t o  a l l  r a t i o n a l  i n v e s t o r s ,  a  p u r e l y  s p e c u l a t i v e  marke t  w i t h  
a  m a r k e t  maker i s  u n s t a b l e .  The marke t  maker w i l l  l e t  T-w 
i n  o r d e r  t o  r e d u c e  h i s  t r a d i n g  l o s s e s  u n l e s s  h e  i s  e i t h e r  sub-  
s i d i z e d  i n  some manner a n d / o r  t h e  s i z e  o f  T  i s  r e s t r i c t e d .  
Governmental  s u b s i d i z a t i o n  i s  n o t  o n l y  p o s s i b l e  b u t  i s  
"supposed"  t o  b e  t h e  p r a c t i c e  on o r g a n i z e d  e x c h a n g e s .  1 2  
L i q u i d i t y  t r a d e r s ,  a s  w e l l  a s  i n v e s t o r s  who e i t h e r  m i s -  
p e r c e i v e  t h e i r  f o r e c a s t i n g  a b i l i t y  o r  do no t  u s e  r u l e s  such  
a s  t h o s e  g i v e n  i n  t h i s  s e c t i o n ,  shou ld  a l s o  s u b s i d i z e  t h e  
s p e c i a l i s t .  However, a s  po in t ed  o u t  i n  S e c t i o n  2 ,  i f  t h e r e  
a r e  l i q u i d i t y  t r a d e r s  o r  t r a d e r s  who c o n t i n u a l l y  m i s p e r c e i v e  
t h e i r  f o r e c a s t i n g  a b i l i t y ,  t r a d i n g  w i l l  e x i s t  even w i t h o u t  a  
market  m a k e r . ,  Thus, i t  i s  n o t  c l e a r  t h a t  i n f o r m e t i o n  i s  of 
g r e a t e r  v a l u e  i n  an  economy wi th  a  market  maker t h a n  i n  an  
economy w i t h o u t  one .  Ra the r ,  t h e  v a l u e  of  i n f o r m a t i o n  under  
a  market  maker depends on t h e  f o r e c a s t i n g  a b i l i t y  of  t h e  
marke t  maker v i s - a - v i s  t h e  i n v e s t o r s  and on p o l i c i e s  r e g a r d i n g  
s p r e a d s ,  s u s p e n s i o n  o f  t r a d i n g ,  and s o  on .  
Although t h e  model p r e s e n t e d  i n  t h i s  s e c t i o n  was conce ived  
p r i m a r i l y  f o r  t h e o r e t i c a l  purposes ,  i t  shou ld  be u s e f u l  t o  
i n v e s t o r s  i n  p r a c t i c e .  I n  o r d e r  t o  u se  t h e  model, i t  i s  
n e c e s s a r y  f o r  a n  i n v e s t o r  t o  de t e rmine  t h e  n e c e s s a r y  i n p u t s  
t o  t h e  model, and t h e  key i n p u t  i s  a  p r o b a b i l i t y  d i s t r i b u t i o n .  
The s p r e a d  a n d / o r  t r a n s a c t i o n  c o s t s ,  r e p r e s e n t e d  by T, shou ld  
be known i n  any g i v e n  inves tmen t  s i t u a t i o n ,  and t h e  remain ing  
f a c t o r s  a f f e c t i n g  t h e  r e s u l t s  o f  t h e  model a r e  t h e  pa rame te r s  
o f  t h e  j o i n t  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  t h e  f o r e c a s t  e r r o r s  of  t h e  i nves -  
t o r  and t h e  s p e c i a l i s t .  
The q u e s t i o n  o f  d e t e r m i n i n g  p r o b a b i l i t y  d i s t r i b u t i o n s  
f o r  f u t u r e  s e c u r i t y  p r i c e s  i s  d i s c u s s e d  i n  d e t a i l  i n  two 
p a p e r s  by w i n k l e r , 1 3  s o  t o  conse rve  space  we w i l l  n o t  r e p e a t  
t h e s e  d i s c u s s i o n s  h e r e .  I n  g e n e r a l ,  a n  i n v e s t o r  should  
u t i l i z e  any i n f o r m a t i o n  and means f o r  p r o c e s s i n g  i n f o r m a t i o n  
t h a t  a r e  a v a i l a b l e ,  imply ing  t h a t  a  p r o b a b i l i t y  d i s t r i b u t i o n  
f o r  f u t u r e  s e c u r i t y  p r i c e s  shou ld  t y p i c a l l y  i n v o l v e  t h e  u s e  
o f  p a s t  d a t a ,  s u b j e c t i v e  judgments of  t h e  i n v e s t o r  and any 
e x p e r t  t h a t  may be c o n s u l t e d ,  and o u t p u t  from any s t a t i s t i c a l  
f o r e c a s t i n g  models t h a t  may be a v a i l a b l e .  I n  t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  
s i t u a t i o n  p o s i t e d  i n  t h i s  p a p e r ,  a  g r e a t  d e a l  o f  r e l e v a n t  
p a s t  d a t a  i s  a v a i l a b l e  o r  w i l l  become a v a i l a b l e  q u i c k l y  a s  
t h e  t r a d i n g  p r o c e s s  goes  on ,  s o  a n  i n v e s t o r ' s  p r o b a b i l i t y  
d i s t r i b u t i o n  should  depend h e a v i l y  on such  d a t a .  By systema- 
t i c a l l y  l o o k i n g  a t  t h e  p a s t  h i s t o r y  o f  h i s  own and t h e  m a r k e t ' s  
e r r o r s  o f  e s t i m a t i o n ,  an  i n v e s t o r  should  be  a b l e  t o  i n v e s t i -  
g a t e  whether  a  normal d i s t r i b u t i o n  p rov ides  a  r e a s o n a b l e  ap- 
p rox ima t ion  o f  t h e  j o i n t  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  f o r e c a s t  e r r o r s .  
Moreover, t h e  p a s t  d a t a  can  be used t o  c a l c u l a t e  e s t i m a t e s  of  
t h e  pa rame te r s  o f  t h e  j o i n t  d i s t r i b u t i o n .  I n  p r a c t i c e ,  a n  
i n v e s t o r  might  make f o r e c a s t s  a t  r e g u l a ?  i n t e r v a l s ,  such  a s  
i n t e r v a l s  o f  one month. I t  would t h e n  be  neces sa ry  t o  i n v e s t i -  
g a t e  t h e s e  f o r e c a s t s  a s  w e l l  a s  month-to-month s h i f t s  i n  t h e  
market  p r i c e .  I t  should  be  mentioned t h a t  models conce rn ing  
e q u i l i b r i u m  p r i c i n g  o f  r i s k y  c a p i t a l  a s s e t s ,  such a s  t h o s e  
d i s c u s s e d  by Sha rpe ,  L i n t n e r ,  and  lack,'^ may be u s e f u l  i n  
i n v e s t i g a t i n g  t h e  per formance  of i n v e s t o r s  and s p e c i a l i s t s .  
I n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  e m p i r i c a l  work implementing t h e s e  models h a s  
focused  on t h e  ' ' r e s i d u a l "  ( i . e .  t h e  movement i n  t h e  s t o c k  
p r i c e  no t  accounted  f o r  by e i t h e r  t h e  s t o c k ' s  l e v e l  o f  r i s k  
o r  t h e  movement i n  t h e  p r i c e  l e v e l  o f  t h e  e n t i r e  s t o c k  m a r k e t ) .  1 5  
The r e s i d u a l ,  which i s  t h e  r e t u r n  above o r  below t h e  e q u i l i -  
br ium r e t u r n  f o r  a l l  a s s e t s  w i t h  a g i v e n  r i s k ,  a p p e a r s  t o  be 
a r e a s o n a b l e  e s t i m a t e  of t h e  s p e c i a l i s t ' s  e r r o r  o f  e s t i m a t i o n  
and can e a s i l y  be e s t i m a t e d  f o r  any s e c u r i t y  where p a s t  d a t a  
a r e  a v a i l a b l e .  
Of c o u r s e ,  t o  t h e  e x t e n t  t h a t  a l l  i n v e s t o r s  p o s s e s s  t h e  
same amount of  i n f o r m a t i o n ,  d e t e r m i n i n g  a  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  
f o r e c a s t  e r r o r s  and u t i l i z i n g  t h e  model of t h i s  s e c t i o n  would 
seem t o  b e  a  s t e r i l e  e x e r c i s e  as f a r  as t h e  p r a c t i c a l  s p p l i c a -  
b i l i t y  of  t h e  a n a l y s i s  i s  concerned .  There i s  ev idence  t h a t  
few i n d i v i d u a l s  o r  models p o s s e s s  enough s p e c i a l  i n f o r m a t i o n  
t o  p r e d i c t  s t o c k  p r i c e s  w i t h  any deg ree  o f  accu racy .  16 
However, some i n v e s t o r s  and models have been  p a r t i c u l a r l y  
s u c c e s s f u l  i n  t h i s  r e g a r d ,  s o  i t  should  be  u s e f u l  t o  b r i e f l y  
rev iew a  few such  c a s e s .  
F i r s t ,  t h e r e  i s  ample ev idence  t h a t  c o r p o r a t e  i n s i d e r s  
p o s s e s s  and a c t  upon s p e c i a l  i n f o r m a t i o n .  l7 However, e ach  
i n d i v i d u a l  i n s i d e r  may p o s s e s s  i n f o r m a t i o n  3n o n l y  one o r  a  
few s e c u r i t i e s .  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  t h e s e  i n s i d e r s  may r e c e i v e  i n f o r -  
mat ion  a t  i r r e g u l a r  i n t e r v a l s ,  and i t  may be o f  v a r y i n g  q u a l i t y .  
Thus, t h e  p r o c e s s  may n o t  be s t a t i o n a r y ,  making it  more d i f f i -  
c u l t  t o  de t e rmine  a  p r o b a b i l i t y  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  f o r e c a s t  e r r o r s .  
Though many inves tmen t  c o u n s e l o r s ,  mutual  f u n d s ,  and 
b r o k e r s  do no t  a p p e a r  t o  p o s s e s s  s i g n i f i c a n t  i n f o r m a t i o n ,  18  
ev idence  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  t h e  Value-Line Advisory S e r v i c e  19  
may p o s s e s s  such  i n f o r m a t i o n .  A s  t h e  performance o f  many 
o t h e r  a d v i s o r y  s e r v i c e s  h a s  n o t  b e e n  examined,  i t  i s  p o s s i b l e  
t h a t  o t h e r  s e r v i c e s  a l s o  p o s s e s s  s p e c i a l  i n f o r m a t i o n .  T h e s e  
s e r v i c e s  i n v e s t i g a t e  many d i f f e r e n t  s e c u r i t i e s  a t  r e g u l a r  
i n t e r v a l s ,  s o  t h a t  p a s t  d a t a  c o u l d  b e  u s e d  t o  a r r i v e  a t  a  
d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  f u t u r e  f o r e c a s t i n g  e r r o r s .  A t  p r e s e n t ,  many 
o f  t h e  s e r v i c e s  o n l y  i n d i c a t e  w h e t h e r  a n  i n v e s t o r  s h o u l d  
buy o r  s e l l  a p a r t i c u l a r  s e c u r i t y ;  a  method o f  f o r e c a s t i n g  
t h e  p r i c e  o f  t h e  s e c u r i t y  would b e  needed i n  o r d e r  t o  a p p l y  
o u r  mode l .  
A s  a f i n a l  example  o f  s u c c e s s f u l  p r e d i c t i o n ,  a few mode ls  
o f  s e c u r i t y  v a l u a t i o n  p r e s e n t e d  i n  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  l i t e r a t u r e  
a p p e a r  t o  b e  s u c c e s s f u l .  F o r  example ,  J o n e s  and  L i t z e n b e r g e r  20 
h a v e  shown t h a t  s t o c k  p r i c e s  d o  n o t  a d j u s t  i m m e d i a t e l y  when 
f i r m s  h a v e  s i z e a b l e  i n c r e a s e s  i n  a c c o u n t i n g  e a r n i n g s .  Though 
J o n e s  and L i t z e n b e r g e r  o n l y  d e c i d e  which  s e c u r i t i e s  s h o u l d  b e  
b o u g h t ,  a  model y i e l d i n g  f o r e c a s t s  o f  t h e  p r i c e s  o f  s e c u r i t e s  
c o u l d  be  d e v e l o p e d .  B l a c k  ar.d ~ c h o l e s ~ '  have  shown t h a t  t h e i r  
t h e o r e t i c a l  model f o r  p r i c i n g  o p t i o n s  h a s  i n f o r m a t i o n  c o n t e n t  
A s  t h e i r  model y i e l d s  a  n u m e r i c a l  v e l u e  f o r  o p t i o n s ,  a n  
e m p i r i c a l  i m p l e m e n t a t i o n  c o u l d  f o l l o w  e a s i l y .  
Even i f  i n v e s t o r s  d o  p o s s e s s  s p e c i a l  i n f o r m a t i o n ,  t h e y  
may n o t  u s e  i t  t o  f u l l  a d v a n t a g e .  A model o f  t h e  t y p e  p r e -  
s e n t e d  h e r e  i s  o f  v a l u e  i n  f o r m u l a t i n g  o p t i m a l  t r a d i n g  r u l e s  
s o  t h a t  i n v e s t o r s  a r e  a b l e  t o  u t i l i z e  t h e i r  i n f o r m a t i o n  i n  
a n  a t t e m p t  t o  i n c r e a s e  e x p e c t e d  r e t u r n .  F o r  example ,  t h e  
r e s u l t s  of B l a c k  a n d  S c h o l e s  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  a l t h o u g h  p r o p e r  
u s e  o f  t h e i r  o p t i o n  p r i c i n g  e q u a t i o n  c a n  y i e l d  p o s i t i v e  r e t u r n s  
w i t h  no t r a n s a c t i o n  c o s t s ,  t h e  e q u a t i o n  canno t  be used t o  
e a r n  p r o f i t s  n e t  of  t r a n s a c t i o n  c o s t s .  However, i n  t h e  ca l cu -  
l a t i o n  o f  p r o f i t s  a f t e r  t r a n s a c t i o n  c o s t s ,  a l l  o p t i o n s  were 
e i t h e r  bought  o r  s o l d .  Using o u r  model, Black  and S c h o l e s  
cou ld  have bought o n l y  t h o s e  o p t i o n s  w i t h  v a l u e s  e s t i m a t e d  
t o  be above  t h e  marke t  p r i c e  by a t  l e a s t  BT and s o l d  on ly  
t h o s e  o p t i o n s  w i t h  v a l u e s  e s t i m a t e d  t o  be  below t h e  marke t  
p r i c e  by a t  l e a s t  BT. By t a k i n g  a p o s i t i o n  i n  fewer  s e c u r i -  
t i e s ,  t h e i r  o p t i o n  model might have been p r o f i t a b l e  even  w i t h  
p o s i t i v e  t r a n s a c t i o n  c o s t s .  
5.  Summary and D i s c u s s i o n  
We have developed  models  o f  two t y p e s  o f  t r a d i n g  proce-  
d u r e s  and we have i n v e s t i g a t e d  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  s p e c u l a t i v e  
t r a d i n g  unde r  t h e s e  p rocedures .  The f i r s t  model i n v o l v e s  a 
s e a l e d - b i d  t r a d i n g  p rocedure  i n  which i n v e s t o r s  t r a d e  d i r e c t l y  
w i t h  o t h e r  i n v e s t o r s .  I n  a  s t a t i o n a r y  world where i n v e s t o r s  
can  accumula te  i n f o r m a t i o n  conce rn ing  t h e i r  f o r e c a s t i n g  
a b i l i t y ,  t h e  amount of s p e c u l a t i v e  t r a d i n g  w i l l  d i m i n i s h  un- 
t i l  t h e r e  w i l l  e v e n t u a l l y  be  no s p e c u l a t i v e  t r a d i n g .  Th i s  
r e s u l t  ha s  i m p l i c a t i o n s ,  d i s c u s s e d  i n  S e c t i o n  3 ,  conce rn ing  
t h e  v a l u e  and p r o d u c t i o n  of  i n f o r m a t i o n .  
The second model p r e s e n t e d  i n  t h i s  paper  i n c o r p o r a t e s  
t h e  n o t i o n  of  t r a d i n g  w i t h  a s p e c i a l i s t ,  who i s  f o r c e d  t o  s e t  
p r i c e s  a t  which any i n v e s t o r  can buy and s e l l  a s e c u r i t y .  
When i n v e s t o r s  t r a d e  w i t h  t h e  s p e c i a l i s t  i n s t e a d  o f  d i r e c t l y  
w i t h  each o t h e r ,  s p e c u l a t i v e  t r a d i n g  w i l l  n o t  c e a s e .  The 
volume o f  s u c h  t r a d i n g ,  however ,  w i l l  depend on t h e  a b i l i t y  
o f  i n v e s t o r s  ( v i s - a - v i s  t h e  s p e c i a l i s t )  t o  f o r e c a s t  t h e  
p r i c e  o f  a s e c u r i t y .  The model p r o v e d e s  o p t i m a l  t r a d i n g  r u l e s  
f o r  a n  i n v e s t o r  and c e n  b e  u s e d  t o  d e t e r m i n e  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  
t h a t  a n  i n v e s t o r  w i l l  b e  a b l e  t o  t r a d e  p r o f i t a b l y  i n  a g i v e n  
s i t u a t i o n .  
The mode l s  d i s c u s s e d  h e r e  a r e  p u r p o s e l y  s i m p l e  s o  t h a t  
t h e  main p o i n t s  a r e  n o t  o b s c u r e d  by u n n e c e s s a r y  d e t a i l s .  
P o t e n t i a l  e x t e n s i o n s  i n c l u d e  t h e  s i m u l t a n e o u s  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  
o f  s e v e r a l  s e c u r i t i e s ,  t h e  i n c l u s i o n  o f  n o n l i n e a r  u t i l i t y  
f u n c t i o n s  f o r  money o n  t h e  p a r t  o f  i n v e s t o r s ,  and t h e  d e v e l o p -  
ment o f  m u l t i p e r i o d  mode l s  t h a t  t a k e  i n t o  a c c o u n t  t h e  p o t e n -  
t i a l  e f f e c t  o f  f u t u r e  d e c i s i o n s  on a c u r r e n t  d e c i s i o n .  2 2 
T h i s  l i s t  i s  by no means e x h a u s t i v e ,  and i t  i s  c l e a r  t h a t  
s u c h  e x t e n s i o n s  would c ~ m p l i c a t e  m a t t e r s  and would make t h e  
model more d i f f i c u l t  t o  s o l v e .  However, s u c h  e x t e n s i o n s  
would n o t  be  e x p e c t e d  t o  c h a n g e  m a t e r i a l l y  t h e  e s s e n t i a l  
n a t u r e  o f  t h e  r e s u l t s  o b t a i n e d  i n  t h i s  p a p e r .  
Though t h e  models  d e v e l o p e d  h e r e i n  have  b e e n  p l a c e d  i n  
z1 f i n a n c i a l  s e t t i n g ,  t h e y  h a v e  i m p l i c a t i o n s  f o r  a l l  a r e a s  o f  
economic a c t i v i t y  where  a s s e t s  o r  c l a i m s  a r e  t r a d e d .  F o r  
i n s t a n c e ,  a n  z n a l o g y  c a n  e a s i l y  b e  drawn be tween  i n v e s t i n g  
i n  s e c u r i t i e s  and g a m b l i n g  o n  s p o r t i n g  e v e n t s .  Some f o r m s  
of g a m b l i n g  o n  s p o r t i n g  e v e n t s  a r e  similar t o  t h e  s e a l e d - b i d  
t r a d i n g  p r o c e d u r e  o f  t h e  model p r e s e n t e d  i n  S e c t i o n  2 
( e . g .  p a r i - m u t u e l  b e t t i n g ,  s u c h  a s  e n c o u n t e r e d  a t  a r a c e t r a c k ) .  
Other  forms of gambling on s p o r t i n g  e v e n t s  a r e  s i m i l a r  t o  t h e  
procedure  of  t r a d i n g  w i t h  a  s p e c i a l i s t  as  i n  t h e  model of  
S e c t i o n  4 ( e . g .  b e t t i n g  on f o o t b a l l  games w i t h  a book ie ,  who 
s e t s  t h e  p o i n t  s p r e a d  a t  which b e t s  a r e  p l a c e d ) .  
I n  pa r i -mu tue l  b e t t i n g  a t  a  r a c e t r a c k ,  t h e  f i n a l  odds ,  
which can  be  t hough t  of a s  a p r i c e ,  a r e  de te rmined  f o r  each 
r a c e  by t h e  a c t i o n s  o f  t h e  b e t t o r s .  Furthermore,  t h e  odds 
a r e  computed a f t e r  a l l  b e t s  have been p l a c e d ,  s o  t h a t  a r e  
not  known f o r  c e r t a i n  i n  advance .  The re fo re ,  t h e  b e t t o r s  
who a r e  b e t t e r  f o r e c a s t e r s  of  t h e  outcomes of r a c e s  t h a n  o t h e r  
b e t t o r s  can  e x p e c t  t o  e a r n  a  p o s i t i v e  r e t u r n  a t  t h e  expense 
of  o t h e r  b e t t o r s .  ( I t  i s  more d i f f i c u l t  t o  e a r n  a  p o s i t i v e  
r e t u r n  i n  t h i s  c o n t e x t  t h a n  i n  t h e  c o n t e x t  o f  t h e  model of  
S e c t i o n  2, however, f o r  t h e  t r a c k  t a k e s  i t s  own c u t ,  o r  
commission, b e f o r e  t h e  t o t a l  amount wagered i s  d i v i d e d  among 
t h e  s u c c e s s f u l  b e t t o r s . )  Under t h e  a s sumpt ions  o f  S e c t i o n  
2 ,  u n s u c c e s s f u l  b e t t o r s  would s t o p  b e t t i n g ,  and e v e n t u a l l y  
no i n d i v i d u a l s  would be w i l l i n g  t o  p l a c e  b e t s .  I n  t h e  r a c e -  
t r a c k  s i t u a t i o n ,  however, n o n l i n e a r  u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n s  f o r  money 
and a  p o s i t i v e  increment  o f  u t i l i t y  due  s imply  t o  t h e  r e c r e a -  
t i o n a l  v a l u e  o f  b e i n g  a t  t h e  r a c e t r a c k  and t o  t h e  " joy"  of  
gambling e x p l a i n  i n  p a r t  why r a c e t r a c k s  do no t  a l l  go o u t  o f  
b u s i n e s s .  
The model o f  S e c t i o n  4 can  be i l l u s t r a t e d  i n  te rms  o f  
gambling on s p o r t i n g  e v e n t s  by c o n s i d e r i n g  b e t t i n g  on f o o t -  
b a l l  games w i t h  a  book ie .  The bookie  i s  analogous  t o  t h e  
s p e c i a l i s t ,  f o r  he  s e t s  t h e  p o i n t  s p r e a d s ,  which can be  thought  
o f  a s  p r i c e s ,  and  b e t t o r s  c a n  c h o o s e  t o  b e t  on e i t h e r  s i d e  
o f  a  g i v e n  p o i n t  s p r e a d .  The b o o k i e  i s  compensa ted  by  a  
p e r c e n t a g e  t a k e n  f rom w i n n i n g  b e t s  a n d / o r  by  w i n n i n g  t i e s .  
( A  t i e  o c c u r s  when t h e  a c t u a l  p o i n t  s p r e a d  i s  i d e n t i c a l  t o  t h e  
b o o k i e ' s  p o i n t  s p r e a d . )  T h i s  c o m p e n s a t i o n  i s  c o m p a r a b l e  t o  
t h e  s p e c i a l i s t ' s  s p r e a d  a n d / o r  ~ 0 n ; m ~ s s i o n .  A l s o  a s  i n  t h e  c a s e  
o f  t h e  s p e c i a l i s t ,  t h e  b o o k i e ' s  c o m p e n s a t i o n  i s  r e l a t e d  i n  
p a r t  t o  h i s  a b i l i t y  t o  f o r e c a s t ,  a l t h o u g h  i n  t h i s  c a s e  t h e  
ou tcomes  o f  f o o t b a l l  games r a t h e r  t h a n  t h e  v a l u e s  o f  s e c u r i -  
t i e s  a r e  t h e  o b j e c t  o f  t h e  f o r e c a s t s .  I d e a l l y ,  a  b o o k i e  would 
l i k e  t o  s e t  a  p o i n t  s p r e a d  s o  t h a t  e q u a l  amounts  a r e  wagered 
o n  e i t h e r  s i d e  o f  t h e  p o i n t  s p r e a d .  I n  t h i s  way, t h e  b o o k i e  
i s  n o t  g a m b l i n g .  No m a t t e r  what  t h e  a c t u a l  outcome o f  t h e  
game i s ,  h a l f  o f  t h e  b e t t o r s  a r e ,  i n  e s s e n c e ,  b e t t i n g  a g a i n s t  
t h e  o t h e r  h a l f ,  and t h e  b o o k i e ' s  " r e t u r n "  i s  a p e r c e n t a g e  
c f  t h e  g a i n s  o f  t h e  w i n n i n g  b e t t o r s  a n d / o r  t h e  possibility 
o" k e e p i n g  a l l  money b e t  on e i t h e r  s i d c  i f  a  t i e  o c c u r s .  
I f  t h e  b o o k i e  s e t s  a  p o i n t  s p r e a d  and a m a j o r i t y  o f  
b e t t o r s  p r e f e r  o n e  p a r t i c u l a r  s i d e  o f  t h e  p o i n t  s p r e a d ,  t h e  
u s u a l  p r o c e d u r e  i s  t o  a d j u s t  t h e  p o i n t  , s p r e a d  i n  o r d e r  t o  
"even  o f f "  t h e  b e t s ,  much a s  a  s p e c i a l i s t  m i g h t  a d j u s t  h i s  
a s k  p r i c e  and b i d  p r i c e  i n  r e s p o n s e  t o  i n v e s t o r s '  a c t i o n s .  
A b o o k i e  who winds  u p  w i t h  more b e t s  on o n e  s i d e  o f  t h e  p o i n t  
s p r e a d  t h a n  on t h e  o t h e r  s i d e  becomes a  g a m o l e r ,  w i n n i n g  i f  
t h e  m a j o r i t y  o f  b e t t o r s  t u r n s  o u t  t o  b e  wrong and l o s i n g  i f  
t h e y  t u r n  o u t  t o  b e  r i g h t .  
Of c o u r s e ,  b e t t o r s  who a r e  a b l e  t o  f o r e c a s t  t h e  outcomes 
of  f o o t b a l l  games a c c u r a t e l y  can ,  by f o l l o w i n g  d e c i s i o n  r u l e s  
such  a s  t h o s e  g e n e r a t e d  by t h e  model of  S e c t i o n  4 ,  o b t a i n  
a  p o s i t i v e  expec ted  r e t u r n .  The i n v e s t o r  who knows t h e  r e l e -  
v a n t  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  f o r e c a s t  e r r o r s  can  make a  f o r e c a s t  on 
t h e  b a s i s  of h i s  judgments conce rn ing  t h e  game and t h e n  r e v i s e  
t h e  f o r e c a s t  a f t e r  s e e i n g  t h e  b o o k i e ' s  p o i n t  s p r e a d .  I f  t h e  
r e v i s e d  p o i n t  sp read  i s  f a r  enough from t h e  b o o k i e ' s  p o i n t  
sp read  t o  overcome t h e  e f f e c t  o f  t h e  b o o k i e ' s  p e r c e n t a g e  o f  
winnings a n d / o r  p o l i c y  o f  winning t i e s ,  t h e  i n v e s t o r  should  
b e t .  
I n  t h e  c a s e  o f  i n v e s t i n g  i n  s e c u r i t i e s ,  t h e  s p e c i a l i s t  
can  o f f s e t  l o s s e s  t o  i n f o r m a t i o n  t r a d e r s  by p r o f i t i n g  from 
l i q u i d i t y  t r a d e r s .  A s  i n  t h e  pa r i -mu tue l  s i t u a t i o n ,  non- 
l i n e a r  u t i l i t y  and a  p o s i t i v e  u t i l i t y  f o r  gambling p e r  s e  
nay c a u s e  b e t t o r s  t o  behave d i f f e r e n t l y  t h a n  t h e  model o f  
S e c t i o n  4 would i n d i c a t e .  Thus, t h e r e  may b e  a  c l a s s  of 
b e t t o r s  who would c o n t i n u a l l y  l o s e  t o  book ie s .  ( S i m i l a r l y ,  
t h e r e  may be  a  c l a s s  o f  i n v e s t o r s  who would c o n t i n u a l l y  l o s e  
t o  s p e c i a l i s t s . )  Th i s  makes t h e  e n t i r e  s i t u a t i o n  more a t t r a c -  
t i v e  t o  t h e  book ie ,  o v e r r i d i n g  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  of  l o s i n g  t o  
a  few ve ry  knowledgeable b e t t o r s .  23 
Appendix I. Derivation of A's Posterior Distribution 
Before PB is known, A's prior distribution Eor P is a 
2 
normal distribution with mean PA and variance aA , 
2 f:p\pA) a exp(-(P - pA) /2uA2) . 
The likelihood function is proportional to f(PB(P,PA), which 
is a normal distribution with mean P + pk(PA - P) and variance 
2 k2UA2(l - p 1, 
Thus, the posterior distribution is 
2 2 P [ (1 - p2) + (1 - pk12] - 2p[k2(1 - p2)pA + (1 - pk)(PB- pkpA)] 
a exp - 2 2k2uA2(1 - p ) 
Completing the square and simplifying, 
~ ( P I P ~ , P ~ )  a exp{-(P - P;)~/~u;~I , 
where 
and 
Hence, A's posterior distribution for P is a normal distribu- 
tion with mean Pi and variance ui2. 
Appendix  TI. A S e a l e d - B i d  P r o c e d u r e  w i t h  n  T r a d e r s  
a n d  I n d e p e n d e n t  F o r e c a s t  E r r o r s  
Assume t h a t  i n v e s t o r  i t s  f o r e c a s t  c a n  b e  w r i t t e n  i n  t h e  
f o r m  P  = P  + ui and t h a t  t h e  j o i n t  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  u l , .  . . , u n  i 
i s  normal  w i t h  E ( u i )  = 0 ,  V ( u . )  = a i 2 ,  a n d  C o v ( u i , u . )  = 0  f o r  1 J 
a l l  i f j. The d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  P  a f t e r  P1, ..., Pn a r e  known 
2  i s  a  normal  d i s t r i b u t i o n  w i t h  mean P* = I ( P i / o i  ) / I  ( l / a i 2 )  
i i 
a n d  v a r i a n c e  o*' = 111 ( l / a i 2 ) .  No s u b s c r i p t s  a r e  n e e d e d  o n  
i 
P* a n d  o t 2  b e c a u s e  a l l  i n v e s t c r s  h a v e  t h e  same p o s t e r i o r  
d i s t r i b u t i o n .  
I n  t h e  s e a l e d - b i d  t r a d i n g  p r o c e d u r e ,  a s sume  t h a t  t P a d i n g  
o c c u r s  a t  M ,  t h e  m e d i a n  o f  t h e  n  f o r e c a s t s ,  s o  t h a t  a n  e q u a l  
number o f  i n v e s t o r s  buy a n d  s e l l .  I n v e s t o r  j b u y s  ( s e l l s )  o n e  
u n i t  o f  t h e  s e c u r i t y  i f  P  > ( < )  M .  I n v e s t o r  j ' s  e x p e c t e d  j 
r e t u r n ,  t h e n ,  i s  P* - M i f  P > M and  M - P* i f  P  < M .  T h i s  j j 
e x p e c t e d  r e t u r n  c a n  b e  w r i t t e n  a s  f o l l o w s :  
L e t t i n g  hi = l / o i L  r e p r e s e n t  t h e  p r e c i s i o n  o f  i n v e s t o r  i t s  
f o r e c a s t ,  
To examine t h e  e f f e c t  o f  changes i n  a  f o r e c a s t e r ' s  p re-  
c i s i o n ,  c o n s i d e r  
The s i g n  o f  a n . / a h  depends on t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  combina t ion  J j 
of  f o r e c a s t s  and p r e c i s i o n s .  For  example, i f  f o r  some i, 
Pi i s  c o n s i d e r a b l y  h i g h e r  o r  lower  t h a n  t h e  o t h e r  f o r e c a s t s  
and hi i s  g r e a t e r  t h a n  t h e  o t h e r  p r e c i s i o n s ,  t h e n  i n v e s t o r  
i h a s  a  s t r o n g  i n f l u e n c e  on n  and on t h e  s i g n o f  a v . / a h  j J j '  
However, g i v e n  t h e  j o i n t  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  f o r e c a s t  e r r o r s ,  
E [ P ~  - p i l p j  > M] > O a n d  E [ P ~  - P . ( P  < M] > 0  f o r  a l l  i # j .  J j 
There fo re ,  b e f o r e  P1,P2, ..., Pn a r e  a c t u a l l y  obse rved ,  
E [ a n . / a h . ]  > 0 ,  imp ly ing  t h a t  f o r  any f o r e c a s t e r ,  g r e a t e r  
J J 
p r e c i s i o n  ( i . e .  s m a l l e r  f o r e c a s t  e r r o r  v a r i a n c e )  i m p l i e s  
a n  i n c r e a s e d  expec t ed  r e t u r n  from t r a d i n g .  
F o o t n o t e s  
l ~ o r  a n a l y s e s  o f  t h e  u s e  o f  i n f o r m a t i o n  f o r  o p e r a t i n g  
d e c i s i o n s  o f  t h e  f i r m ,  s e e  Gonedes [121 and A l c h i a n  [l] . 
F o r  a n a l y s e s  o f  t h e  u s e  o f  i n f o r m a t i o n  t o  b r i n g  bu e r s  and 
s e l l e r s  t o g e t h e r ,  s e e  S t i g l e r  [28] and S t i g l e r  [29r.  Fo'r 
a n a l y s e s  o f  t h e  c s e  o f  i n f o r m a t i o n  f o r  t r a d i n g  p u r p o s e s ,  s e e  
Manne [21], Fama and L a f f e r  [9],  and H i r s c h l e i f e r  [41]  . 
'These p o i n t s  a r e  d e v e l o p e d  i n  b o t h  Fama and L a f f e r  [9] 
and H i r s c h l e i f e r  [41 ] .  
3 ~ a m a  and L a f f e r  [g] . 
4 ~ s  n o t e d  l a t e r  i n  t h i s  s e c t i o n ,  t h e  e s s e n t i a l  n a t u r e  o f  
o u r  r e s u l t s  g e n e r a l i z e s  t o  t h e  c a s e  o f  n  i n v e s t o r s .  F o r  s i m p l i -  
c i t y ,  we d e v e l o p  t h e  model f o r  t h e  s p e c i a l  c a s e  o f  n  = 2 .  
'This  a s s u m p t i o n  i f  u s e f u l  f o r  p u r p o s e s  o f  e x p o s i t i o n  b u t  
n o t  n e c e s s a r y  f o r  o u r  a n a l y s i s .  The i m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  t h i s  n o d e l  
c o n c e r n i n g  t r a d i n g  a r e  b a s e d  on t h e  ex p o s t  r e a c t i o n  o f  i n v e s -  
t o r s  t o  t r a d i n g  s u c c e s s e s  o r  f a i l u r e s  r a t h e r  t h a n  o n  t h e i r  
ex  a n t e  c a l c u l a t i o n  o f  e x p e c t e d  r e t u r n s ,  s o  knowledge o f  t h e  
d i s t r i b u ' i o n  i s  n o t  c r u c i a l .  
6 ~ r a d i n g  d u r i n g  t h e  p e r i o d  w i l l  n o t  i n f l u e n c e  t h e  v a l u e  
o f  P ,  which  i s  d e t e r m i n e d  by a n  exogenous s t o c h a s t i c  p r o c e s s .  
Thus ,  t h e  t r a d i n g  p r o c e d u r e  c a n  be  viewed a s  a  zero-sum game 
w h e r e ,  o v e r  t i m e ,  some i n d i v i d u a l s  g a i n  by t r a d i n g  o n  t h e  b a s i s  
:of new i n f o r m a t i o n  and o t h e r  i n d i v i d u a l s  l o s e  by s u c h  t r a d i n g .  
7 ~ t  c o u l d  a l s o  be  c a u s e d  by n o n s t a t i o n a r i t y  i n  t h e  p r o c e s s  
g e n e r a t i n g  f o r e c a s t  e r r o r s .  F o r  example ,  a n  i n v e s t o r  may i m -  
p r o v e  i n  t e r m s  o f  f o r e c a s t i n g  a b i l i t y  o v e r  t i m e .  Given t h e  
c o n t i n u o u s  t r a d i n g  p r o c e d u r e ,  t h e  m a r k e t  wou;d q u i c k l y  a d j u s t  
t o  s u c h  n o n s t a t i o n a r i t y ,  s o  t h e  c e s s a t i o n  o f  t r a d i n g  would o n l y  
be  b r i e f l y  i n t e r r u p t e d .  Only v e r y  p e r v a s i v e  and e x t r e m e  non- 
s t a t i o n a r i t y  would a l t e r  t h e  g e n e r a l  n a t u r e  o f  t h e  r e s u l t s  
p r e s e n t e d  i n  t h i s  s e c t i o n .  
'of c o u r s e ,  i n  p r a c t i c e  a c o m b i n a t i o n  o f  c o n d i t i o n s  s u c h  
a s  m i s p e r c e p t i o n s  o f  f o r e c a s t i n g  a b i l i t y ,  n o n s t a t i o n a r i t y ,  . 
a  l a r g e  number o f  t r a d e r s ,  t h e  i n c l u s i o n  o f  new t r a d e r s  o v e r  
t i m e ,  and s l o w  r e s p o n s e  t o  e v i d e n c e  r e g a r d i n g  t r a d i n g  a b i l i t y  
may imply t h a t  no e q u i l i b r i u m  w i l l  b e  r e a c h e d  and t h a t  t r a d i n g  
w i l l  c o n t i n u e  t o  o c c u r .  
' see  Fama and L a f f e r  [9], H i r s c h l e i f e r  [ 1 4 ] ,  and Manne [2:1.]. 
l0Fama and L a f f e r  [g, p.  2931 p o i n t  o u t  t h a t  i n f o r m a t i o n  
i s  o n l y  of  v a l u e  i n  t h e i r  model when i t  i n c r e a s e s  t h e  s t o c k  
p r i c e ,  a s  s h o r t  s e l l i n g  i s  p r o h i b i t e d .  
' ' ~ i r s c h l e i f e r  [lb]. This  pa rag raph  on ly  p r e s e n t s  a  r u d i -  
mentary form of  H i r s c h l e i f e r ' s  argument .  
 he s e c u r i t i e s  and Exchange Commission e x p e c t s  s p e c i a l i s t s  
t o  buy i n  f a l l i n g  marke ts  and s e l l  i n  r i s i n g  marke ts  i n  o r d e r  
t o  s t a b i l i z e  s t o c k  p r i c e s  ( i . e .  t o  m a i n t a i n  an  " o r d e r l y "  m a r k e t ) .  
Th i s  p rocedure  should  r e s u l t  i n  l o s s e s  which a r e  t o  b e  pa id  
f o r  o u t  of  t h e  s p e c i a l i s t ' s  s a l a ~ y ,  which i n  t u r n  i s  p a i d  by 
t h e  s t o c k  exchange.  However, s p e c i a l i s t s  do n o t  appea r  t o  
u s e  t h i s  s t a b i l i z i n g  s t r a t e g y  i n  g e n e r a l .  (See  N e i d e r h o f f e r  
and Osborne [23] f o r  a n  e x p l a n a t i o n  ol" t h i s  phenomenon.) 
13wink le r  [31] and Winkler  [32]. 
1 4 s h a r p e  [26], L i n t n e r  [19], and Black  [4] .  
15see  Fama [8] f o r  a  r ev i ew  of  e m p i r i c a l  work u s i n g  r e s i -  
d u a l  a n a l y s i s .  S p e c i f i c  s t u d i e s  u s i n g  t h i s  concept  a r e  Fama, 
F i s h e r ,  J ensen ,  B a l l  and Brown [2], Scho le s  [25], 
Mandelker [22], I bbo t son  L15J. 
1 7 s e e  G las s  [ll] , Rogoff [24], L o r i e  and Neiderhoff  e r  [20], 
J a f f e  1161, and Scho le s  [25]. 
1 8 s e e  Cragg and Malk i e l  [6], E l t o n  and Gruber [7], and 
Jensen  Ll7]. 
''see S h e l t o n  1271, Hausman [13], and Black [4] . 
2 0 ~ o n e s  and L i t z e n b e r g e r  [18]. 
2 1 ~ l a c k  and Scho le s  151. 
2 2 ~ e e  Winkler  and Ba r ry  [33]. 
2 3 ~ m p i r i c a l  ev idence  ( s e e  Winkler [307 ) s u g g e s t s  t h a t  
market  p o i n t  s p r e a d s  de t e rmined  by book ie s  a r e  q u i t e  a c c u r a t e  
r e l a t i v e  t o  p o i n t  s p r e a d s  de t e rmined  by s p o r t s w r i t e r s  and n a i v e  
b e t t o r s .  Such b e t t o r s  p robab ly  b e t  more o f t e n  t h a n  t h e  model 
o f  S e c t i o n  4 i m p l i e s  t h a t  t hey  should  f o r  s p e c u l a t i v e  purposes .  
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